The second generation of peacekeeping operations resulted from the United Nations Organization s Operation in the Congo (ONUC) in early 60s. The importance of ONUC (or UNOC 1 ) in the development of multi-dimensional peacekeeping and more particularly the concept of the use of force is undeniable. The tribute in the evolution of the concept of the use of force finds its root in Katanga, where the United Nations are believed to have waged their first war in the history of peacekeeping operations. The present paper dissects United Nations operations in the Katanga in the 60s in the context of military and civilian insubordination. It explores different aspects in the coordination of military operations that led to accidental death of UNSG Dag Hammarskjold. Legal and operational facets of the katangan operations will be the focus of this discussion.
Introduction
The African post-independence period had been one of the most critical eras in the history of many nations. Some had a smooth and peaceful transition, while other went through tumultuous situations necessitating international support of various natures. Many factors justified the sudden eruption of violent conflicts in newly decolonized states. Among these were the lack of experience and skills in the management of state affairs on the part of newly promoted leaders, hidden and secret agendas and instigation of trouble to justify immixion in their former colonies affairs, on the part of former metropolis. The disorder engendered by the struggle for independence and/or a difficult transition from colony to new state created too much pressure on the United Nations at the peak of the Cold War. The United Nations support, either in the form of Trusteeship or peacekeeping operations, was the only way to avoid confrontation of Superpowers on the ground of protecting their zone of influence and interests.
The Congo did not make an exception to post-independence conflicts, as was the case in many African countries. Early after its independence, the Congo faced a breakdown of law and order and generalized chaos, which prompted authorities to turn to the United Nations for assistance restoring peace and stability. Established under UNSC Resolution 143 adopted on July 14, 1960 , the United Nations Operations in the Congo, known through its French acronym ONUC (Organisation/Operations des Nations Unies au Congo), was the first United Nations Peacekeeping Mission of its kind established by the Security Council (Liu 1999:34) , but drew its principles from those enunciated for UNEF (Findlay 2002:52) . ONUC remains one of the most important missions throughout the history of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. It is also one of the most controversial particularly on aspects related to the use of force. The main source of controversy rose from the interpretation of mandates and the legalistic approach dictated by the conformism of UN peacekeeping principles inherited from previous peacekeeping missions, and the evolutionary approach demonstrated by Dag Hammarskjold, then Secretary-General of the Organization (AbiSaab 1978:39-44). Of the two contending approaches, the former wished to stick to the strict application of the principle of the use of force only as a last resort in self-defense; the latter promoted an evolution of the concept of use of force and that of self-defense. The use of force and the concept of self-defense in United Nations peacekeeping operations radically changed, thanks to ONUC (Liu 1999:34) . This paper will focus on the aspect surrounding the use of force on the legalistic angle, the respect of the mandate, hierarchical instructions and directives related to the use of force in ONUC. Given the importance of the Katanga in this respect, the spatial circumscription of this discussion will be limited to this province during the period from 1960 to 1964. The main point of this discussion will be whether or not operations in Katanga were a consequence of civilian and military insubordination . In order to determine the eventuality of civilian or military insubordination there is a need to analyze different mandates over the use of Force in the Katanga and its direct impact on the course of the mission.
The motivation behind the choice of United Nations Force (UNF) in the Katanga for this discussion lies, as mentioned above, in its importance on the evolution of the Concept of Peacekeeping Operations and particularly on the burning subject of the recourse to force to implement a particular aspect of the mandate. The Katangan secession seems the choice of predilection for the study of peacekeeping and peace enforcement under the UN banner. The great share of ONUC s legacy on the evolution of peacekeeping operations would be attributed to operations in Katanga.
I. The Independenc e of the Congo and the Chaos
In 1885 at the Conference in Berlin, King Leopold II was able to obtain recognition for the Association Internationale Africaine or the International Association for Africa (IAA), the sovereignty equal to that of an independent state. The IAA gave way in 1885 to Congo Free State. Since the beginning of the colonization of the Congo in 1876, it was a private property of King Leopold II until 1908 c. The incapacity of the Government to restore and maintain law and order within its territory, d. The Katangan secession (11 July 1960) , and e. Misunderstanding of the process of transfer of authority from Belgians to Congolese nationals -mostly due to lack of preparedness (James 1996: 20-21) .
The lack of preparedness was a logical consequence of Belgium s paternalistic colonial approach which mainly suggested taking care of basic needs of Congolese in order to keep them 2 http://geocities.com/capitolhill/rotunda/2009/congolese _provinces.html#(2)#(2). 3 Most of political parties were tribal groups which had been politicized to justify democracy. happy without giving them voice in the administration of the res publica and the lack of elite for continuity. At Independence, average of Congolese university graduates was between14 to 31 out of an estimated population of 14.000.000 (Ibid).
The collapse of law and order emphasized by rivalry of President Joseph Kasavubu and his Prime Minister P.E. Lumumba, apparently motivated by tribal pressure (Epstein 1965: 9-12) . This led to internal tensions, aggravated at the international level by the presence of Belgian troops assimilated by the Social and Communist block, led by USSR to an [NATO s] invasion of a sovereign State, threatening to intervene in order to end the aggression . This position was dictated by socialist obedience of P.M. Lumumba. At this point, a direct confrontation between the USA and the USSR in the Congo became a very strong possibility. The recourse to the UN was the only solution to avoid a East-West war in the Congo. ONUC s intervention had the credit of avoiding of direct military confrontation of the two superpowers (USA and USSR) on the Congolese ground.
II.

Genesis and deployment ONUC
The major difficulty for the Congolese government remained the secession of the richest province declared by Moise Kapenda Tshombe, leader of the CONAKAT. Officially, the secession was to preserve Katanga from the fallout that the rest of the Congo faced. This secession meant evasion of revenue from the important mineral exploitation represented by the Union Miniere du HautKatanga (UMHK) and a precedent for other provinces to secede from the central government, and consequently the total balkanization of the Congo. In order to save the state from a predicted end, P.E. Lumumba called on the United Nations for assistance in order to restore peace and order. To respond to the request from the government of the Congo, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold submitted a request to the Security Council, invoking, for the first time in the history of the United Nations, Chapter XV, article 99 of the UN Charter for discussions (Findlay 2002:52 III.
The Katangan Secession
Settlement processes in the province were initiated under the auspices of a quasi-independent entity, the Comite Special du Katanga CSK (Lemarchand 1962 Earlier, the UNSC considered Katangan secession 5 a purely internal matter, as stressed in the UNSC Resolution 146 6 and it was meant to be settled between Central Government and Katanga Provincial authorities without any international interference. It [UNSC] focused its attention on the withdrawal of foreign Troops and the maintenance of law and order. The only role the UN could play in this case was to create conditions for negotiations and play the good offices role. 4 From the literal translation of the French expression: Poumon Economic used for Gécamines, new name for UMHK, and Kolwezi, the main copper and cobalt mining center. 5 Presumably because of Soviet Union 6 Paragraph 4 of Resolution 146, logically meant that the Force would not intervene in the Katangan problem. The main reason implementation of Security Council was hindered in the Katanga was the fear of its authorities that UN would end the secession on behalf of the Central Government. This declaration was a kind of assurance to them so that they get the official position of the Security Council and facilitate implementation of the mandate in their province. 
V.
Legal bases on the use of Force in the Katanga
Before discussing the use of force in Katanga, it is important to mention the difficulties encountered by the UN to deploy its troops in the breakaway province. The first provision to be explored is the concept of self-defense. Traditional self-defense provision authorized peacekeeper use force to protect from direct harmful attack. Die to necessity, the concept was extended in order to fit the situation in the field. From this new approach, self-defense would comprise peacekeeper s personal protection from attack, imminent attack; the same applying to civilian under the protection of peacekeeping forces. Self-defense, in the spirit of ONUC, would include disarmament and detention, pending deportation. The second provision concerned the use of force to restore freedom of the movement of the UNF guaranteed by the SOFA agreement. This provision, never used before appeared in operations in Katanga, though it generated many protestations because of circumstances surrounding these operations. Besides this procedural framework, any decision regarding the use of force had to be sanctioned by the UNSG or his delegate. It appears clearly, that UNSG s directives gave a hierarchical chain which was to be scrupulously respected whenever the question of the use of force appeared. The management of day-to-day operations in PKOs was UNSG s responsibility. He was accountable to the UNSC for PKOs, thus critical decisions belonged to him. It is in the light of the hierarchy and procedures and binding texts and directives that the following analysis will dissect events and mechanisms that surrounded enforcement measures and operations surrounding that sealed the fate of the Katangan secession.
VI. Enforcement Measures in Katanga and the End of the Secession
After difficult negotiations, UN Forces deployed and started implementing the mandate within the Katanga. Their mandate included among the others, the apprehension and expulsion of foreign and uninvited troops, maintaining law and order and the prevention of civil war. This exercise was not easy for a number of reasons among which prevailed, on the Katangan side, the fear of the end Considering the UN s chain of command and the approval system on sensitive operations, the three new aspects of Rum Punch, even though they were operational details and not noticeable from the outside, were questionable, i.e. they were not done in accordance with given instructions.
They could only be justified in a case of emergency. Obnubilated details of the operation would have represented a problem in case of complications. The fact that no attention was paid to these details possibly meant a chèque en blanc (blanket authority) given to UN officials in the Katanga at the heights of the tension, and would explain steps taken for the next operation.
Rumpunch met no resistance from the Gendarmerie until instruction to halt the operation were given, apparently upon demand of consular representatives 10 in Katanga, who promised to conduct the grouping and expelling of their nationals. Overall, Operation Rumpunch would be seen as a success because of the inexistence of casualties on both sides, including civilians, its effectiveness 9 Munongo was Tshombe s Minister of interior and virulent opponent of the UN in Katanga. I was believed to be the principal orchestrator of the resistance against the UN. of a party to the Conflict (Katanga) to persuade it to negotiate were brought about concerning this operation. 15 The Katangan gendarmerie established roadblocks to isolate UNF from its Headquarters in preparation of attacks 16 Force Commander. Despite its irreproachable planning and co-ordination, some issues need to be pointed out as they had marked the conduct of Operation Onukat. First, the freedom of movement provisions were not enforced. Thus, the use of force to restore freedom of movement to peacekeepers was not covered by the actual mandate of ONUC. Second, UNF compliance to provisions of the International Humanitarian Law on targeting civilian and military objectives and specially hospitals, ambulances
and ICRC vehicles presumably due to treachery and perfidy performed by the Gendarmes, using ambulances and ICRC vehicles and the use of hospitals and civilian residences to fire or direct fire against UNF (Rikhye 1995: 96) .
Some critics consider that the operation had the purpose of ending the secession using the backdoor of self-defense (Findlay, 1999: 122) , argument denied by George Ivan Smith 17 , whereas others claim, just as for operation Morthor, it went beyond the borderline separating peacekeeping to peace enforcement (Rikhye, 1993, 297) . Nevertheless, this last allegation depended on the interpretation of UNSC resolution 169, which had enforcement measures. And there is no clear practical delineation between peacekeeping with enforcement measures and peace enforcement.
d. Round three: Operation Grand Slam
In the volatile situation, tension grew very high during the last quarter of 1962 and Katangan
Gendarmerie were conducting acts of provocation and political leaders multiplied negative propaganda against UN and calling for general fighting against UN Force. UN personnel and property were subject to recurrent attacks from the gendarmes after talks between Tshombe and Adoula had failed due to lack of commitment of the former. The last resort was the use of coercive measures to end the secession for the sake of unity and international peace. Gendarmes preferred fighting against the UN rather than re-integrating the Congo, they even threatened using scorched earth and sabotaging the infrastructure. Elizabethville due to time difference. After troops had crossed the river, it was difficult to evoke the self-defense justification, thus the invocation of the freedom of movement provisions. However, as mentioned above, this justification was questionable on the legal basis, in relation to the mandate.
Conclusion
Of course, ONUC remains one of the most important missions beyond traditional conception of Peacekeeping operations; it was the first multifunctional mission comprising both the military and civilian component. It also remains one of the largest UN Peacekeeping Missions ever deployed and operations in Congo marked the evolution in the concept of use of force and that of selfdefense. However, behind this evolution and success, some black spots remained. At what cost did the UN operate these important changes in peacekeeping operations? The cost of these changes was too high. ONUC intervention in the Congo was to assist the government to restore law and order and arrange conditions for the settlement of internal and constitutional disagreements. The operations in the Congo, in general and those in Katanga in particular, were marked by critical incidents principally based upon the interpretation of mandates, understanding of the role of the UN in the Congo and the conduct of operations in the field, thus casting a negative 18 Acting UNSG in replacement of the deceased Hammarskjold. 19 River Close to Jadotville.
image on an operation that had brought revolution on the way the world community handles conflicts today.
In The failure of state led to a situation where the UN had to act as a national police in maintaining law and order, and sometime they were asked to carry duties, which were beyond the scope of a peacekeeping mission. The lack of understanding on the side of Congolese authorities was also due to a poor Public Information to explain UN role and the limitation of its mandate. UN operations in the Katanga had been entailed by actions, which were, at different stages, different from 
